Abstract This paper uses the city level roll-out of legal service grants to evaluate their effects on crime. Using Uniform Crime Reports from 1960 to 1985, the results show that there is a short run increase of 7 percent in crimes reported and also a 13 percent increase in crimes cleared by arrest. Results show an increase in the staffing of police officers in cities that received legal services. These cities are also associated with having higher median property values 10 years later. This supports the narrative that legal services changed police behavior through litigation or threats of litigation.
After decades of decline, reported crime in the United States began to rise in the early 1960s. The rise in violent crime, especially homicide, pushed crime to the forefront of political debates (Grimes & Loo 2004) . Accompanying the rise in crime, was a series of civil demonstrations that escalated into wide spread riots during the summer of 1964. Riots in Harlem, Rochester, and Philadelphia presented political obstacles for launching President Johnson's War on Poverty. 1 Relatedly, the response of law and order to riots and rioters created more tension between blacks in urban areas and local police officers (O'Reilly, 1988) .
Concerns over the decline of urban communities and eruptions of urban violence resulted in the inclusion of experimental programs within the War on Poverty that would reduce the likelihood of riots.
In 1965 the Neighborhood Legal Services Program (LSP) was introduced to provide the poor with legal channels to remediate grievances, especially those resulting in riots (Gillette, 1996) .
2 Historically, the poor had limited access to legal institutions due to financial constraints and discrimination. Many viewed the lack of legal recourse produced demonstrations that escalated into riots in poor Gillette (1996) welfare, such as property values. Past literature has shown property values to be negatively related to crime (Pope & Pope, 2010) . More so, the evaluation of property values sheds light on the influence of the legal service program on riots and urban decline.
My research design takes advantage of the differential timing of the LSP implementation in cities across the United States and uses a before and after design to analyze changes in outcomes after the establishment of the LSP. I use an event-study framework (Jacobson et al. 1993 ) which provides a statistical description of the evolution of pre-trends in outcomes as well as the dynamics of changes after the program began. My results show that there is a short run increase in criminal offenses reported and offenses cleared by arrest after LSP grants are received. Cities that receive LSP grants are associated with a 7 percent increase in the number of crimes reported and a 13 percent increase in offenses cleared by arrest 3 years after a grant is received. After 4 years, reported crime and arrests decrease and evolve similarly to untreated cities.
These findings may reflect two different phenomena: an increase in actual crime (consistent with critics and the second quote above) or an increase in the reporting of crime (consistent with advocates and first quote above). Although it is difficult to disentangle changes in crime versus changes in reporting, the eventstudy specification provides insight into the evolution of crime after the LSP was established. The intertemporal response of crime and arrest after LSP is implemented displays an immediate increase in reported crime and arrest followed by a large decrease in reported crime. This hump-shape response is consistent with an increase in reporting followed by a decrease in actual crime. This is similar to Levitt's (1998) emphasis on changes in reporting behavior due to changes in likelihood that a crime will be solved. Second, there is an immediate increase in the staffing of police officers in cities that received federally funded legal services which has been shown to be inversely related to crime (Levitt 1997 , McCrary 2002 , 2013 Evaluations of social policies from the War on Poverty provides important information about short and long term effect that can guide contemporary crime and riot prevention policies. Citizens in poor communities historically have had negative interactions with law enforcements and the Legal Service Program was a policy intervention that had success with changing police and community behavior. Equally important, the legal service program provides a unique case study where a policy intervention provided impoverished groups additional security or access by ensuring that their legal rights were protected. Intuitively, this protection does not only work to correct market inefficiencies but also increases demand for goods the poor previously lack access to. By increasing access to welfare, housing, and proper police services, the poor indirectly benefits from the reduction in the cost of lawyers. For example, one expression of market inefficiency is the severe under reporting of crime. Myers (1980) finds that the actual crime rates between 1970 and 1974 were 1.5 to 3 times larger than reported crime. If some criminal offenses are under-reported due to lack of institutional responsibility or the victim perception of institutional responsibility, legal services would work to increase the number of crimes reported. 
I. Brief History of Legal Services Under the War On Poverty

A. Empowerment of the Poor through Legal Services
The Federal Legal Services Program was motivated by an influential journal article by Jean and Edgar Cahn, which called for the "civilian perspective"
to be incorporated in the War on Poverty (Cahn & Cahn, 1964) . The Cahns'
proposal was concerned with the potential of large bureaucracies generating monopoly power, concluding that the only way to protect the true interest of the poor was to provide them with accessible legal representation. Giving the poor the ability to criticize, dissent, and compel responsiveness of local institutions would allow the poor to participate in helping themselves.
The Cahns' proposed that university-affiliated, neighborhood law firms be established to serve as intermediaries between the community and those administering social programs. The law firms would provide professionals to aid in developing and stimulating leadership through opportunity, orientation, and The deterrence of "militant community effort" refers to the availability of a lawyer to provide avenues for differences between the poor and various entities to use the political and judicial establishments to solve problems peacefully. Proponents of Federally Funded Legal Services often boast of their success with ending or resolving differences that resulted in riots. 7 The OEO was responsible for the antipoverty programs and one of the largest initiatives was the Community Action Programs (CAP). Community Action Programs are the bread and butter of the Anti-poverty movement. 8 It took two years for federally funded legal services to be fully operational due to opposition from local bar associations. The American Bar Association pledged full cooperation on February 8, 1965. community action agencies influenced funding, resulted in a wide time variation of the establishment of the LSP in various cities (Johnson, 1974 concert with local police officers; these relationships were credited with reducing the likelihood of riots by using the judicial system to solve disputes peacefully.
Conceptually, the availability of legal aid would serve as a deterrent for unfair or unjust treatment by police authorities (i.e., police brutality or not taking reports). 12 If police services were underutilized by the poor due to social and political structure or resources, LSPs would attempt to correct the market inefficiency. The examination of the victimization reports and reported crime records reveals a distinct difference between the actual and observed crime rate.
Boggess and Bound (1999) summarized the differences between Victimization
Reports and the Uniform Crime Report and surmised that reporting plays a large role in the discrepancy. According to Boggess and Bound, the large difference reflects reporting behavior of victims and witnesses as well as reporting behavior of the police. 13 There are several reasons why this difference between actual and reported crime occurs. First, the pecuniary gains from reporting are likely small if the possibility of recovery is near zero. Also, the victim or observer of a crime is not likely to report if the criminal is of close relation or if retaliation is possible.
Additionally, political pressure to keep crime rates down, the social economic status of victims, conviction rates, and various other reasons cause crime to go unreported.
14 If some criminal offenses are under-reported due to lack of institutional responsibility or the victims perception of lack of institutional responsibility, legal services could work to increase the number of crimes reported and the number offenses cleared by arrest.
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According to the mechanisms outlined above, the introduction of the LSP has two possible implications within a Becker type crime model. For potential criminals (supply-side), the LSP increases the quality of criminals and as a result, decreases the marginal cost of committing a crime. Consequently, this will decrease the number of crimes cleared by arrest, increase the number of crimes committed, and increase the number of crimes reported. For non-criminals (demand for crime prevention), the LSP could improve police-community relationships which increases the reporting of crime. Better policing and more reporting would also lead to an increase in arrests which serves as a deterrent for committing future crimes.
Combining the two offsetting effects, the prediction that follows is that LSPs could increase or decrease crime after legal services grants were received.
Furthermore, both of these changes in crime would result in an increase in reported crime. However, what is important from a social capital perspective is whether actual crime increased or decreased due to the establishment of LSPs.
My analysis uses property values to shed light on this.
II. Data On Legal Service Grants and Crime
Data on the recipients of federal legal services grants funded by the OEO were compiled from the National Archives Community Action Program (NACAP) files. NACAP provides information on the city, county, and state for which the funds were received and the targeted communities. Also, provided is the date the grant was issued, the amount of the grant, and a brief description for the intended purpose of the grant. I use this information to match legal services grants to city level observations on crime and I use the date of the first grant to identify when the legal services program started.
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Data on crime comes from the Uniform Crime Reporting: Offenses Known and Clearance by Arrest (UCR). The data on crime includes monthly information on the number of unfounded offenses, actual offenses, offenses cleared by arrest, and offenses cleared involving individuals under the age of 18.
The following offenses of interest are recorded in this database: murder and manslaughter, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle thefts.
Also recorded is the number of offenses cleared by arrest for each of these criminal offenses.
City characteristics in this analysis are taken from the 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990 proportion of residents who are non-white and smaller proportion of residents with more than 12 years of schooling which is reflected with lower median incomes. However, cities that received grants are similar to unfunded cities with regard to the proportion of residents who are men and between the ages of 15 to 24 and 25 to 39, a key determinant of crime (Blumstein and Rosenfeld, 2008) .
III. Event-Study Methodology
The empirical strategy will take advantage of the variation in the location of LSPs. Although there are key cross-sectional differences between funded and unfunded cities, the identification strategy is dependent on how crime evolves before the establishment of the legal services program. Legal services programs were rolled out over an 11 year interval. 21 I use the variation in the timing and location of funding within an event-study framework to test for causality. The event study framework lends itself well for testing the effects of an outcome before and after exposure to the treatment and provides another falsification test for how crime is evolving before treatment.
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The pre-treatment effects test whether changes in the outcomes occur before the implementation of treatment. I estimate the effects of federally funded legal services using the following linear regression:
where , is the annual log number of offenses per 100,000 residents in city i in year t (t= 1960, 1961,…1985) ; is a set of city effects which control for unobservable city characteristics that are time invariant; is either a set of year 
IV. Results
A. Using the Timing of First Grants to Identify Impact
Using the estimates from equation 1, I plot pre-treatment effects and posttreatment effects from a balanced panel. Figure 2 Total crime is an unweighted aggregate of property crime and violent crime.
Property crime includes burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft, whereas violent crime aggregates include murder, manslaughter, rape, assault, and robbery. According to all three models, the point estimates for − are near zero or slightly less than zero but statistically insignificant. After the first year of operations, changes in offenses reported are positive and statistically significant.
The log of actual offenses reported increases drastically over the next three years and is statistically significant. Using model 3 estimates, total crime per 100,000 residents increases 7 percent three years after treatment. Three and four years after treatment, total crime reported begins to decrease and eventually becomes indistinguishable from zero. The results are consistent with buildup of services within a community. After the grant is received, neighborhood legal services will have to hire staff, build community support and rapport, while also accumulating exposure.
Estimates in figure 3 are produced using weighted least squares and exclude New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. These cities are excluded to avoid giving them enormous weight. More importantly, these cities lack a proper comparison within the treated or control samples, which is important because identification is dependent on both timing and location. 25 Population weights are used in my analysis to gain efficiency when error term has heteroskedasticity related to city size. However, weighted least squares (WLS) often lead to estimates that are less efficient than ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates (Haider, Solon, and Wooldridge, 2013) . In my analysis, weighted least square produces estimates of the pre-treatment effects that are smaller in absolute value and have smaller t ratios than OLS estimates. Also post-treatment effects for WLS regressions are larger than OLS estimates and have larger t-ratios. This is consistent with WLS procedure capturing the pre-period trend in crime.
26
B. Interpretation of the Impact of Federally Funded Legal Services
The availability of legal services is associated with a large increase in crime as predicted under the context of Becker's Crime Model. The hump shape response indicates that there is an increase in crime followed by a decrease in 25 Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York receive legal service grants in 1966. 26 Estimates including New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles as well as OLS regression are available upon request.
crime after legal services became available. However, the hump shape response does not distinguish between changes in actual crime or the reporting of crime.
On one hand, this result is consistent with LSPs increasing the demand for police service and reducing the demand for crime. Advocates of the LSP boasted about its effectiveness in reducing police brutality, minimizing or stopping riots, increasing victim response time, and ensuring filing of police reports.
Improvements in these areas should enhance the relationship between the poor and police. Ensuring police filed reports alone will increase the reported crime rate without changes in criminal behavior. By protecting the poor's legal rights to adequate law enforcement protection and services, legal services could increase the likelihood that a crime is reported and also increase the likelihood that the report would be investigated. In general, these effects will not only lead to more reporting but also increase the probability of arrest, given a criminal offense occurred.
While the intertemporal response of reported crime provides evidence of changes in reporting behavior, I cannot dismiss the possibility of changes in criminal behavior. In part, the hump shape response is also consistent with an increase in actual crime followed by a decrease in crime. According to opponents, LSP lawyers decreased the probability of arrest and conviction. The combination of these effects could embolden criminals and result in more crimes being committed. Although not articulated by opponents, the decrease in crime could be a result of increased police effort to clear offenses by arrest. Despite the conflicting view points, it is clear that the establishment of legal services increased reported crime in treated cities. crime and police from Levitt (1997 Levitt ( , 2002 and McCrary (2002 McCrary ( , 2013 , this implies that violent crime would be expected to be reduced by 6 to 14 crimes per 100,000 residents because of additional police officers. The reduction in property crime would be between 25 and 94 crimes per 100,000 residents. The estimates show a steady increase in the log of murders reported before and after treatment but the estimates never becomes statistically significant nor does it display hump-shape response. After legal services begin, the log of rapes per 100,000 residents and the log of robberies per 100,000 residents reported increase LSPs were unlikely to increase actual crime. Also, crimes that are typically under-reported, such as rape, display the largest increase. This is consistent with an increase in reporting in places where legal services are established.
C. Event-study results for Arrest and Number of Police Officers
D. Event-study results by UCR crime category
The notion that crime is decreasing while reporting is increasing is not unique in the crime literature. 29 Boggess and Bound (1997) showed that reported crime increased in the UCR in the 1980's while crime decreased according to the National Crime Survey. 30 They concluded that overall criminal activity decreased by virtue of the fact that the murder rate declined over the sample period, while reporting over the sample period increased. Consistent with their story, my results indicate that the impact of LSPs on murder and manslaughter are statistically insignificant although the post-treatment estimates are positive.
However, other criminal categories that are reported somewhat accurately indicate that crime may actually be increasing due to legal services. Two categories that are likely to be reported somewhat accurately are robberies and 29 Levitt (1998) makes a similar argument about the effect of police on the reporting of crime. Levitt argues that an increase in police officers increases the likelihood that a crime is reported and reduces that amount of actual crime that occurs. 30 National Crime Survey was implemented in 1972 to collect data on victimization. The data is administered by the Bureau of Justice Statistics and available at the ICPSR. The NCS provides information about crimes reported and not reported to the police as well as provides information about the victim and the offender. The increase in reporting overtime is also substantiated by Biderman and Lynch (1991) .
motor vehicle theft (Bogges and Bound, 1997; Levitt, 1998) . According to figure   6 , the post-treatment effects are positive and statistically significant. If LSPs are improving reporting of crimes, it is reasonable to assume that murders and motor vehicle theft would be unaffected. However, I find large effects for motor vehicle theft and a positive effect on murder. It is quite possible that legal services are associated with increases in actual crime or are associated with events that increased crime.
V. Discussion
A. Legal Services and Property Values
Evidence thus far indicates that the establishment of legal services programs increase reported crime. These estimates imply that LSPs are associated with an increase in reported crime of roughly 7 percent. Legal services are also associated with an increase in arrest and the number of police officers in treated cities. All together these results are consistent with legal services reducing crime and increasing social capital by requiring citizens and public institutions to become more responsible for community development. However, they may also reflect an increase in crimes committed.
One attempt to distinguish between changes in actual crime versus reported crime is to examine changes in the value of homes. Reducing crime will make communities safer and consequently influence property values in treated cities. Conversely, an increase in crime would reduce them. This is consistent There is caution required in using the median property value as a measure of welfare. In part, is likely that users of legal services were not home owners and property value will not capture changes in the welfare of the poor. Additionally, changes in the property value in high crime areas may not impact the value of property in low crime areas or the median home owner. However, policing and criminal activity is a city level statistic and can have spillover effects within a city. Policing high crime areas and minimizing the opportunity for crime to spread outside of high crime areas could be reflected in the median property value of all home owners. Therefore, using median property value is a modest attempt to estimate the causal effect of LSPs on the welfare of the poor and the community as a whole.
To analyze the impact of LSPs on property values, I estimate the following difference-in-difference regression:
The dependent variable is the log of the median residential property value for all home owners in city i in year t from 1960, 1970, and 1980 Decennial Census.
LSP is equal to 1( − * > 0) which is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a legal services project is operating in city i before census year t. The row 
B. Using Rioting to Distinguish Changes in Reported Crime
It is reasonable to be concerned that the significant increase in reported crime after exposure to federally funded legal services is a direct consequence of riots that occur during this time period. 31 The inclusion of year fixed effects will capture national events that increase crime across cities. However, all riots are not triggered by national events. Therefore, year fixed effects and state by year fixed effects will not capture changes in local sentiments that may result in riots.
If the increase in reported crime is purely a consequence of rioting, then legal services were either established in locations where rioting would occur or in places where rioting was the most intense or severe. Although riots are considered spontaneous events (Collins & Margo 2007) , it is likely that LSPs are established in places where the tension between institutions and the poor/minorities is high. As mentioned before, the program was considered an anti-rioting initiative by advocates and thus selection on the likelihood of riots is plausible but difficult to test.
To examine these concerns, I use riot data from Collins and Margo (2007) .
Included this data is a riot severity index which compares riots across cities in the sample. I use the riot intensity index to test how rioting effect my estimates. Table 5 displays estimates for the log of total crime per 100,000 residents.
Column 1 includes estimates of model 3 from figure 3. Column 2 displays 31 According to data from Collins and Margo (2007) , 409 riots are recorded in 193 cities in the sample. Event-studies estimates show that riots are associated with higher level of crime after the first riot in a city occurs. These estimates are not presented but are available upon request.
estimates from model 3 including a variable for riot intensity in city j in year t.
Estimating the effect of legal services on total criminal offenses reported accounting for rioting does not change the pre-and post-treatment effects. The coefficient on rioting is positive and statistically significant but small. There are various explanations why this occurs. One reason is that many of the riots in
Collin and Margo's data are relatively small. Also, more intense riots may reflect changes in national sentiment and are captured by year fixed effects. Lastly, changes in crime could be a post-riot effect related to changes in demographics and economic activity due to rioting.
C. Other War on Poverty Grants
Another reasonable concern is that any impact of the LSP is just a reflection of other programs introduced in President Johnson's War on Poverty.
The LSP operated within Community Action Agencies until 1969. The link between legal services and community action agencies are not linear in the sense that there are locations with legal services and without community action agencies (and vice versa). Table 6 reports pre-treatment and post-treatment effects for the Office of Economic Opportunity grants on log of total criminal offenses reported per 100,000 residents. In column 1, the event is the timing of the first Head-Start grant, column 2, uses Community Action Agency grants, and column 3 uses Legal Services grants. Head-Start provides a placebo test since this program was not linked to community action agencies. While the Community Action Agency is a test of the litany of programs housed as Community Action Programs.
According to table 6, pre-treatment and post-treatment effects in columns 1 and 2
are not statistically significant. If changes in reported crime were due to the influx of resources devoted toward fighting poverty and not legal services, column 2 would show a significant decrease or increase in reported crime.
However, reported crime only changes when the event is the establishment of the legal service program.
VI. Conclusion
In 1960 
